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There is a striking contrast between the vast number of inter-
national and local unions in the United States, and the relatively
small number of reported cases involving officers, elections and finances
in the period prior to the enactment of the Landrum-Griffin Act.' A
few of the many factors contributing to bring about this result are
worth some discussion here.
The scope of judicial intervention in the trade union field has
been limited by the basic approach of the courts to cases in this area.
The substantive law generally applicable to intraunion proceed-
ings holds that the constitution of the organization constitutes a con-
tract which binds the participants. Thus, at least under this theory,
the courts would not be free to interfere with what might generally
be considered undesirable union conduct so long as it was permissible
under the union's bylaws. The case results indicate, however, that the
courts have been more interested in achieving basic justice than simple
conformity to what have sometimes been inadequate constitutional pro-
cedures, and for this reason, the courts have tended to find interference
with property rights as a basis for intervention where the simple con-
tract theory was insufficient.
Undoubtedly the relative infrequency of decisions is also attribut-
able in part to such obvious factors as the cost of litigation, the de-
lays incident thereto, the requirements of exhaustion of internal
remedies, and the lack of protection afforded to the litigant. However,
in all fairness, the relative scarcity of decisions in a field so vast must
indicate also general satisfaction on the part of union membership
with the way in which their unions have operated at the grass-roots
level.
Any student of the labor movement knows that the literal pro-
visions of many union constitutions are no true indication of the
actual democracy within the particular organization. Infused in the
structure and fabric and daily conduct of most unions is the ideology
out of which the organizations emerged. In many instances their con-
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stitutions are documents drawn by workers unskilled in law, and the
unions have adhered nevertheless to the ethical, spiritual and demo-
cratic qualities that motivated their early leadership. The ethical
practices codes have reaffirmed the fact that the ethics of the market
place are not deemed adequate by the labor movement itself. A
balanced picture, however, must recognize that in significant areas of
the union body politic, undemocratic practices and even corruption
had become a significant problem.
All this of course points up the fact that the trade union move-
ment does not exist apart from the society that nurtures it. The Mc-
Clellan Committee hearings were not alone a commentary on segments
of the labor movement, but on the ethical state of our industrial so-
ciety as a whole. For any group within society to raise itself signifi-
cantly above the general ethical level is indeed a Herculean effort re-
quiring motivated and inspired leadership. "To separate labor officers
and to apply the standards of the public official, or even more stringent
standards, to his personal and official life," Dunlop has written, "in-
volves an ideological uprooting of the union officer from his place as
a part of the larger business system."' 2 Kerr points out that single-
party control is characteristic not only of the typical international
labor union, but of such other groups in our democratic society as the
corporation, the fraternal order, the religious denomination, the farm
organization, and even the political party.' Regardless of such struct-
ure, however, the international union can be extremely responsive to
membership desires and pressures, and at the local level contests for
major office are frequent. The local union leaders who have tried to
prevent members from attending meetings have hardly been as serious
a problem as the apathy of members who, in spite of every inducement,
prefer to watch television and engage in social activities rather than
attend union meetings. This, again, has been a characteristic problem
of all groups in our society. As a practical matter, in most local unions
the leadership has been subject in the last analysis to the members'
control, independent of statutes or court intervention.
Common law remedies were for various reasons inadequate for
the resolution of intraunion problems. Unions, as voluntary associa-
tions, did not possess juristic personality and, hence, were not suable
at common law. In addition, a member of a voluntary association could
not sue the association for damages, for it was said that he was legally
2 Dunlop, "The Public Interest in Internal Union Affairs," reprinted in Selected
Readings Prepared for the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, United States Senate, "Government Regulation of Internal Union Af-
fairs Affecting the Rights of Members" (85th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1958)).
3 Kerr, "Unions and Union Leaders of Their Own Choosing," reprinted in Selected
Readings, supra note 2, at 111.
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as responsible as any other member for the obligations of the group,
and he would in effect merely be suing himself. The remedy at law
would ordinarily be inadequate because the peculiar nature of the
problems presented was not susceptible of solution by monetary
damages. From all this, it is apparent that if solution to problems
of control by members over officers, funds, and elections was to be
secured under the existing legal framework, it had to be through the
use of some of the traditional remedies available in courts of equity
where the union could be directly made a party. Two of the so-
called "extraordinary remedies"--mandamus and receivership-have
been used from time to time by courts of equity in dealing with intra-
union problems, in addition to the other equitable remedies of in-
junction and accounting. The literature has been surprisingly barren
of consideration of these "extraordinary remedies" by courts of equity
in connection with intraunion disputes. They will be here considered,
followed by an examination of the provisions of the two federal enact-
ments which are applicable to the problem-the National Labor Rela-
tions Act 4 as amended, and the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959,1 which has revolutionized the law in this field.
MANDAM US, INJUNCTION, AND ACCOUNTING
Historically, the writ of mandamus issued from a court of superior
jurisdiction, directed to a private or municipal corporation or any of
its officials, or to an inferior court, commanding the performance of a
specified act of a public, official, or ministerial duty, or directing the
restoration to the complainant of rights or privileges of which he has
been illegally deprived.6 It was not surprising that a member hoping
to find some way to compel action by a union official would seek to
utilize this ancient writ. However, certain real drawbacks stood in the
way. First, mandamus would not ordinarily lie to regulate the inter-
nal affairs of an unincorporated association since two natural persons
are involved.7 Second, issuance of the writ required the showing of a
clear, legal right to the performance of a particular act; it would not
command a discretionary act, nor would it issue where the law
afforded any other remedy.'
As early as 1888, a California court allowed the writ in a suit
against a union after an expulsion from membership. The court re-
fused to apply to an unincorporated association a standard any dif-
4 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958).
5 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. I, 1959).
6 55 CJ.S. "Mandamus" § 1 (1948).
7 State v. Miers, 49 S.D. 96, 206 N.W. 236 (1925).
s High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies 17 (3d ed. 1896).
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ferent than "to incorporated bodies of the same character."9 Sub-
sequently, a California court in one case issued a writ of mandamus
commanding the union defendant to afford the plaintiff a full and fair
hearing or to reinstate him,10 and in another case the court in a
mandamus proceeding compelled an unincorporated labor union to
allow members to inspect certain financial records of the association
without even a requirement of exhaustion of internal remedies."
Other states frequently achieved the same result but instead of issuing
a writ of mandamus (where the defendant was an incorporated asso-
ciation), the court, in a suit in equity for an injunction, would simply
direct reinstatement.' 2
Since the remedy at law was never adequate in this field, an
equity court could issue an injunction where there was a showing of
irreparable injury to the personal or property rights of the individual.'3
Moreover, where a property right was involved, the court would fre-
quently intervene even if internal remedies had not been exhausted. 14
Courts have not hesitated to issue injunctions in connection with intra-
union problems, whether they related to officers, 15 elections, 16 or
funds.'
7
At the instance of a member, courts have been disposed to require
an accounting of funds by union officials.' This relief has also been
combined with an order compelling an election.' 9 Not infrequently
9 Otto v. Journeyman Tailors Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 Pac. 217 (1888).
10 Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 37 Cal. 2d 134, 231 P.2d 6 (1951). Writ of
mandate issued directly ordering reinstatement in Dingwall v. Amalgamated Ass'n of
St. Ry. Employees, 4 Cal. App. 565, 88 Pac. 597 (Ct. App. 1906).
11 Mooney v. Local 284, Bartenders Union, 48 Cal. 2d 841, 313 P.2d 857 (1957).
12 Burke v. Monumental Div., 286 Fed. 949 (D.C. Md. 1922); Holmes v. Brown,
146 Ga. 402, 91 S.E. 408 (1917); Meurer v. Detroit Musicians' Ass'n, 95 Mich. 451, 54
N.W. 954 (1893); Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J. Eq. 759, 53 Atl. 230
(1902); Simons v. Berry, 240 N.Y. 463, 148 N.E. 636 (1925).
Is 43 C.J.S. "Injunctions" § 16 (1945).
14 Oil Workers Union v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 2d 512, 230 P.2d 71 (CL
App. 1951); Bell v. Sullivan, 183 Misc. 543, 49 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1944); contra,
Leahigh v. Beyer, 116 N.E.2d 458 (Ohio C.P. 1953); Local 104, Intl Bhd. of Boiler-
makers v. Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 28 Wash. 2d 536, 183 P.2d 504 (1947).
15 DeMonbrun v. Sheet Metal Workers Ass'n, 140 Cal. App. 2d 546, 295 P.2d 881
(Ct. App. 1956); Schrank v. Brown, 192 Misc. 80, 80 N.Y.S.2d 452 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
16 Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Sibilia v.
Western Electric Employees Ass'n, 142 N.J. Eq. 77, 59 A.2d 251 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948);
O'Neill v. Journeymen Plumbers Ass'n, 348 Pa. 531, 36 A.2d 325 (1944).
17 DeMonbrun v. Sheet Metal Workers Ass'n, supra note 15.
18 Bell v. Sullivan, supra note 14; Local 104, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Int'l
Bhd. of Boilermakers, supra note 14.
19 O'Neill v. Journeymen Plumbers Ass'n, supra note 16. An excellent treatment of
election problems is found in Summers, "Union Powers and Workers' Rights," 49 Mich.
L. Rev. 805 (1951).
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the court acted to protect a local union from seizure by its parent
international." But whether by way of mandamus, or injunction, or
accounting, courts have been a considerable facility for protecting
the union member in a contest with his union and its officials. The
cost of litigation has, however, undoubtedly been a serious practical
impediment to legal recourse in many cases.
RECEvERS
A judicial device which on infrequent occasions has been utilized
by the courts in connection with internal union problems has been the
receivership. This remedy, which is among the oldest known in the
court of chancery,21 consists of the appointment by the court of a
person to manage and preserve the property during the pendency of
suit.22 The receiver can be appointed "where such action may be
deemed necessary to preserve property of an organization ... against
fraudulent acts of persons entrusted with its property, or where there
is no properly constituted governing body, or where internal dis-
sension makes impossible the successful conduct of its affairs. '23 In
such a situation the receiver is appointed only for the period the
case is pending and only where it appears to the court that the assets
of the organization will otherwise be wasted or diverted through fraud,
mismanagement or dissension.24
Where the facts are such as to impel the placing of a local union
under receivership, the court is not likely to require that all adminis-
trative remedies shall have been exhausted as a prerequisite to such
relief.25 Judges have recognized the right of unions generally to func-
tion without interference by the courts.26 But the courts, notwith-
standing, act where the affairs of a local are "on the verge of complete
20 Schrank v. Brown, supra note 15. Abuse of power by international officers ap-
pears in a number of cases. Local 11, Int'l Ass'n of Bridgeworkers v. McKee, 114
NJ. Eq. 555, 169 AUt. 351 (Ch. 1933); O'Neill v. journeymen Plumbers Ass'n, supra
note 16.
21 75 C.J.S. "Receivers" § 4 (1952).
22 Robinson v. Nick, 235 Mo. App. 461, 136 S.W.2d 374 (1940).
23 Local 11, Int'l Ass'n of Bridgeworkers v. McKee, supra note 20, at 560, 169
At. at 353.
24 Robinson v. Nick, supra note 22.
25 Local 11, Int'l Ass'n of Bridgeworkers v. McKee, supra note 20; Robinson v.
Nick, supra note 22.
20 "The authority of the officers of the aforesaid local in the conduct of its business
affairs should be regarded as absolute when such officers act within the law. Questions of
policy of management of the business affairs of said local should be left to the members
of the local insofar as they do not contravene or violate the constitution and laws pro-
vided for its government." Local 11, Int'l Ass'n of Bridgeworkers v. McKee, supra note
20, at 560, 169 AUt. at 353.
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disruption" and receivership appears "to be the only solution of the
problem confronting the court." The receiver is not "expected to bring
pressure to bear upon an employer for a closed shop, or to call a
strike, or to take his place in the picket line, for none of such things
pertaining to the policies of the union and the personal activities of
its members are any part of his function as a receiver. ' 27 It has been
recognized that a court of equity cannot operate a labor union, and
that the labor organization's bargaining power is completely suspended
during the time it is under the supervision of the courts. The re-
ceiver's "function as an officer of the court by which he is appointed,
and from which he derives whatever power he possesses, is only to
receive, manage, protect, and preserve the property committed to his
possession, holding it during the pendency of the suit for the benefit of
all parties concerned, and retaining possession, subject to the proper
orders of the court, until such time as he may be finally discharged."2
Among the situations where receivers have been appointed have
been the following: (1) where the officers have engaged in fraudulent
and undemocratic practices;30 (2) where the local is in the process of
dissolution;3 (3) as an interim device in connection with securing an
accounting of the funds,"2 or the holding of a new election, 3  or prop-
erly ascertaining the results of a prior contested election;34 or (4) as
a security measure it may be sought by a judgment creditor.3 5 Re-
ceivership is a harsh remedy which the courts will utilize only in
extreme cases.3" Under it, the union's functioning as a democratic
institution is completely suspended.3 7 Control is taken from the officers,
but rather than being lodged in the members, is placed in a court-
appointed official.38 Probably a typical reaction is that of Professor
27 Robinson v. Nick, supra note 22 at 482, 136 S.W.2d at -.
28 Mursener v. Forte, 186 Ore. 253, 205 P.2d 568 (1949).
29 Robinson v. Nick, supra note 22, at 482, 136 S.W.2d at
30 Collins v. Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employers and Moving Picture
Machine Operators, 119 N.J. Eq. 230, 182 Ati. 37 (Ch. 1937); Mursener v. Forte,
supra note 28.
31 Kealy v. Faultener, 18 Ohio Dec. 498 (C.P. 1907).
32 Local 373 v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridgeworkers, 120 NJ. Eq. 220, 184 Ad. 531 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1936).
33 Collins v. Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employers and Moving Picture
Machine Operators, supra note 30.
34 Sibilia v. Western Electric Employees Ass'n, supra note 16.
35 Dist. 21, UMW v. Bourland, 169 Ark. 796, 277 S.W. 548 (1925).
36 Mursener v. Forte, supra note 28. For a case in which appointment of a receiver
was denied, see Fitzgerald v. Abramson, 89 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
37 See Note, 27 Ore. L. Rev. 248 (1948); Note, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1037 (1933).
38 Receivership has been called "the most drastic remedy and the most expensive
luxury known to the realm of law." Note, 42 Yale L.J. 1244, 1248 (1933).
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Cox who calls it "intolerable for the Government to appoint outsiders
to act as receivers [of a labor union]."" British courts have long been
precluded by statute from appointing receivers over labor unions,
and there is a dearth of reported cases involving such receiverships.
The great historical connection between labor law and receiver-
ships is wholly unrelated to the appointment of receivers over labor
unions, about which there is not even any discussion in encyclopedias
and treatises.40 The origin of the labor injunction has been traced to
the business receivership cases of the final quarter of the last century
in which the courts, through receivers, took over the operation of some
of the major railroads of the country.41 When workers struck against
railroads, which were in receivership, they found themselves facing
the summary p9wer of federal judges to punish by contempt those who
interfered in any way with the functioning of the court or its ap-
pointed officials.42 The courts in the modern union receivership cases
have not shown the iron determination to prevent resistance to their
action shown in the railroad receivership cases. An open defiance of
a court order by electing officers and adopting a constitution in a local
under receivershil was in one case held not to constitute contempt.43
Similarly a court voided an expulsion of an official who had been
charged with circulating false and malicious statements in a circular
protesting the appointment of a receiver.44
39 Cox, "The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609,
634 (1959).
40 A leading law encyclopedia cites numerous actions and proceedings in which
the receivership device is available, but there is no reference therein to labor unions.
75 C.J.S. "Receivers" § 7 (1952). The same is true of a leading text on the subject.
Clark, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Receivers (3d ed. 1959).
41 Nelles, "A Strike and Its Legal Consequences--An Examination of the Receiver-
ship Precedent for the Labor Injunction," 40 Yale L.J. 507 (1931). In 1877 President
Scott of the Pennsylvania Railroad asserted: "The laws which give the Federal courts
the summary process of injunction to restrain so comparatively trifling a wrong as
infringement of a patent right certainly must have been intended or ought to give the
United States authority to prevent a wrongdoing which not only destroys a particular
road but also paralyzes the commerce of the country and wastes the national wealth."
Id. at 533. Concerning this, Nelles observed: "This, it is believed, was the first
suggestion of the possibility of labor injunctions in the United States." Ibid.
42 Secor v. Toledo, P. & W. Ry., 21 Fed. Cas. 968, 971 (No. 12,605) (C.C.N.D. Ill.
1877); King v. Ohio & M. Ry., 14 Fed. Cas. 539 (No. 7,800) (C.C. Ind. 1877). In
another case the court refused to order the receiver to reinstate employees who had
earlier gone on strike in protest against a wage reduction because "to do so would
cause the removal of competent men who served the receiver under adversity." Booth
v. Brown, 62 Fed. 794 (C.C.N.D. Wash. 1894).
43 Koukly v. Canavan, 154 Misc. 343, 277 N.Y. Supp. 28 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Koukly
v. Weber, 154 Misc. 659, 277 N.Y. Supp. 39 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
44 Schrank v. Brown, supra note 15.
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Today both the railroad receivership cases and the few union
receivership cases are quite remote from the practical problem of the
control of union members over officers, elections, and finances.
MONITORS
A recent variation of the receivership device has been the monitor-
ship which grew out of the bitter controversy involving the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters. This plethora of litigation had
its origin in a suit filed in the district court for the District of Colum-
bia on September 19, 1957, which sought an order preventing a con-
vention of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters which was
scheduled to commence eleven days thereafter.4 On September 28,
1959,--two days before the convention was to begin-a preliminary
injunction was issued enjoining the Teamsters front conducting an
election of officers at the convention. The same day the court of
appeals stayed the effectiveness of the order, thus permitting the
convention to proceed. Chief Justice Warren, in circuit, refused to
interfere.4" At the convention the union's constitution was amended
and James R. Hoffa was elected General President, his term of of-
fice to commence December 1, 1957. On October 14, 1957, an
amended complaint was filed, and on October 23, 1957, an order was
issued enjoining any of the elected officers from assuming office.
After another quick appeal and some minor modification of the
temporary injunction by the court of appeals, the trial on the merits
began. The plaintiffs adduced evidence from December 2, 1957, to
January 16, 1958, with occasional interruptions including discussion
by counsel of the possibilities of a disposition of the case by consent.
A settlement was reached and on January 31, 1958, a consent decree
was signed under the terms of which the officers-elect assumed office
and a Board of Monitors, consisting of one nominee of the plaintiffs,
one of the defendant-Teamsters, and a mutually selected chairman,
was appointed to supervise the union's operations. The contest that
subsequently ensued among the Monitors themselves, as well as the
present stalemated situation, are well known, and the details are not
here important.
Two significant differences between the monitorship and the re-
45 These facts concerning the Teamster-Monitor Litigation are taken from a
mimeographed study by one of the attorneys for the Teamsters Union, Raymond W.
Bergan.
46 Cunningham v. English, 78 Sup. Ct. 3 (1957). The Chief Justice said: "To en-
join the election of officers of an international union of 891 locals and 1,500,000 members
during the course of its convention proceedings, on allegations of conspiracy supported




ceivership are apparent: First, the monitorship is consensual while
the receivership may be imposed over the opposition of one or more of
the parties; second, the monitorship is tripartite by nature, while the
receivership is ordinarily a single individual independent of the litigants.
The requirement of consent makes it unlikely that monitorships will
be used in most intraunion situations requiring reform; any tri-
partite body has discernible weaknesses in a major power struggle,
such as has been involved in the Teamster-Monitor Litigation. It is
interesting to note that a monitorship has since been established in
Puerto Rico in a case growing out of alleged violation of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, where the consensual
aspect of monitorship was retained, but only a single monitor ap-
pointed.4 7
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Fears generated in certain parts of the labor movement by the
Teamster-Monitor Litigation resulted in the introduction in the 86th
Congress of a bill to amend the Norris-La Guardia Act to prohibit
federal courts from having "jurisdiction to issue or continue in effect
any judicial order appointing a receiver, trustee, master, monitor, or
administrator ... to manage or administer, or supervise the manage-
ment or administration, of the affairs of any labor organization .... ,,48
On behalf of the bill, Representative Roosevelt stated that he had
introduced it at the request of the National Maritime Union and the
Flight Engineers International Association, both AFL-CIO affiliates,
because he had "carefully looked into the matter and reached the con-
clusion that such legislation reflects the very sound principle that the
operation of labor unions should remain in the hands of the member-
ship .... ,,49 President Meany of the AFL-CIO voiced firm opposition
to the bill since its purpose was "to free the officers of the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters from the supervision now exer-
cised by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
through a Board of Monitors appointed by it.""0 This "must neces-
sarily tend to impair the independence of the federal judiciary," Mr.
Meany stated, because Congress would be thus intervening "for the
purpose of affecting the outcome of a particular pending case."'"
47 Main v. UDEM de Puerto Rico, 46 L.R.R.M. 2744 (D.C. Puerto Rico 1960).
48 MR. 11958, S6th Cong., 2d Sess. A proviso adds: "That nothing contained herein
shall be construed to prevent the appointment of a receiver for the sole purpose of pre-
serving the funds, property, or assets of a labor organization pending the conduct of
an election of officers or vote upon the removal of officers pursuant to the [Landrum-
Griffin Act]."
40 106 Cong. Rec. 8185 (daily ed. April 27, 1960).
50 Letter from George Meany to Rep. Edwin E. Willis, May 17, 1960.
5 1 Ibid.
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Aside from this, however, Mr. Meany observed that he knew of no
evidence that the federal courts had abused their powers to appoint
receivers or monitors, and he thought that during "a schism situation,"
it was a necessary power for the courts to have, "to prevent one group
of members from unilaterally possessing itself of assets claimed by a
rival group.""2 The bill died in a subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD REmEDIEs
While the Landrum-Griffin Act53 primarily creates and protects
rights and remedies for union members affecting their status and
privileges within their unions, apart from their employee status, the
Taft-Hartley Act 4 essentially creates and protects rights which are
based upon employment relationship and collective bargaining and not
upon internal incidents of union membership.5 Under the National
Labor Relations Act [NLRA], protection is afforded to employees
who seek either to join or not to join unions, but the internal relation-
ship between member and union generally is not subject to regula-
tion by the National Labor Relations Board [NLRB].11 As long as
the member's job status is not affected, the union's power with
respect to its members is not regulated, absent any coercion or in-
timidation. Section 8(b) (1) (A) expressly preserves from regulation
the union's right to prescribe its own rules for the acquisition or
retention of membership. This exemption is qualified only to the
extent that where membership in the union is required as a condition
of employment, the initiation fees required may not be "excessive
or discriminatory" and dues must be uniform.
Prior to the Landrum-Griffin amendments, the NLRA denied
access to NLRB processes to unions unless they filed with the Secre-
tary of Labor their constitutions and bylaws and detailed information
regarding their internal procedures, as well as a financial statement
which was also required to be made available to the members of the
52 Ibid. For a contrary view, see Pressman, "Appointment of Receivers for Labor
Unions," 42 Yale L.J. 1244 (1933).
53 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. I, 1959).
54 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141
(1958).
55 Some overlapping is probably inevitable. See Johnson v. Local 58, Int'l Bhd.
of Electrical Workers, 181 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1960), holding that the right
of assembly, which is protected by § 101(a) (2) of Landrum-Griffin, may be invoked
against union officials' threats of job discrimination against members of the local union
-who met to seek a separate charter for their group.
56 UAW v. Hinz, 218 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1955).
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union; also the officers of the union first had to file non-communist
affidavits with the NLRB. These requirements, however, created no
corresponding rights for members to compel unions to furnish financial
statements or to compel them to comply with the reporting and affi-
davit requirements of the act. 7 No machinery existed under that law
by which an employee could compel compliance with the filing or
affidavit requirements by a union which was willing to do without the
NLRB's services." The act makes no reference to internal union elec-
tions, nor does it furnish union members with any remedies before
the NLRB whereby they can exercise control over their officers.5 9
The NLRB exercised no direct control over union funds or financial
malpractices of union officials. Some deterrent against abuse of power
by union officers probably results from the availability of the NLRB's
election procedures for decertification or for a change of bargaining
representatives. ° The availability of the latter alternative has, however,
been substantially reduced by the existence of "no-raiding agree-
ments" among many unions precluding any interference with the
representation rights enjoyed by any signatory to such pact, and by
the NLRB's application of the contract bar doctrine.6'
'57 See Bennett v. Lodge 992, Bhd. of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 159 F. Supp. 93
(D.C. Mass. 1958).
58 The Taft-Hartley reporting and affidavit requirements were repealed by the
Landrum-Griffin Act. 73 Stat. 524 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 431 (d) and (e) (Supp. I, 1959).
59 Union members and non-members alike have a right under the act to equal
representation, but as a practical matter it is a right which is hardly enforceable before
the NLRB itself except through the drastic remedies of decertification or change of
bargaining representatives. See Cox, "The Duty of Fair Representation," 2 Vill. L. Rev.
151, 172-75 (1957), suggesting that breach of the duty of fair representation should be
treated by the NLRB as an unfair labor practice, as was held in Holman v. Industrial
Stamping and Mfg. Co., 142 F. Supp. 215, 218-19 (E.D. Mich. 1946). See also, Welling-
ton, "Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal
System," 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1333-43 (1958).
60 The transfer of one union's funds to another with consequent unavailability of
sick and death benefits to the adherents of the first union was held to invalidate the
results of an NLRB election in which the second union obtained a majority. Kearney
& Trecker Corp. v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1954), denying enforcemtent to 101
N.L.R.B. 1577 (1952).
61 Despite the considerable evidence developed by the McClellan Committee of
financial irregularities by certain officials of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
and the fact of the Teamster expulsion from the AFL-CIO on grounds of corruption,
the Board refused to apply the "schism" doctrine to cases involving membership efforts
to disaffiliate from the Teamsters Union during the term of an existing collective bar-
gaining agreement, on the ground that no union had been chartered by the AFL-CIO
to cover the Teamster jurisdiction. B & B Beer Distributing Company, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B.
1420 (1959); cf., Hershey Chocolate Corp.,. 121 N.L.R.B. 901 (1958).
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UNION MEMBERS' CONTROL OVER OFFICERS, ELECTIONS, AND
FINANCES UNDER LANDRUm-GRIFFIN
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 19592
provides a double-barrelled weapon to enforce sound financial practice
and internal democratic procedures. The union member in some in-
stances is provided with relatively easy access to the federal courts to
enforce his rights and in some instances he may also call upon the
formidable resources of the federal government, which in turn is
armed with broad investigatory powers and criminal sanctions. Un-
fortunately, the new statute is unable to counteract the apathy and
indifference on the part of individual members and to infuse a desire
to participate, which is a necessary element-and probably the most
important one-in achieving the desired objective.
Title 163 of the Landrum-Griffin Act codifies the basic rights of
individual members and places some basic limitations upon the power
of unions and their officers. Section 101 (a) (1) guarantees equal rights
for all members with respect to the nominations of candidates, voting
in elections or referenda, attendance at meetings and participation in
deliberations, subject to reasonable rules in the union's constitution
and bylaws. It is significant that the new act does nothing to remove
the barriers of racial or other forms of discrimination against obtain-
ing membership in unions, so that there remains unremedied the
problem of employees who cannot join and participate in the affairs
of the unions which act as their statutory representatives. 4 The good
faith of the sponsors of the new act will remain in doubt so long as
the law remains so glaringly lacking in the area of basic civil rights.65
62 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. I, 1959).
63 73 Stat. 522-23 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (Supp. I, 1959).
64 "The right to participate is not fully protected, however, as long as employees
in the bargaining unit are arbitrarily excluded from membership. Although unions have
made much progress in removing color bars from their constitutions, a number still
refuse to admit Negroes. The state courts, with one exception, have refused to grant
any person admission to the union. The ACLU believes that a complete bill of rights
must include the right of a worker to join the union which acts as his representa-
tive .... " From Statement of the American Civil Liberties Union on Proposed Legislation
to Protect Internal Rights of Union Members, S. 1555, H.R. 4473, H.R. 3028 and H.R.
7265, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), submitted to House Education and Labor Commit-
tee, June 16, 1959.
65 On August 12, 1959, Rep. Powell of New York offered an amendment to H.R.
8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), to prohibit discrimination by a collective bargaining
representative with respect to admission or retention of membership or in the representa-
tion of employees, on grounds of race, religion, color, sex or national origin. Rep.
Powell said, in part, "How ridiculous it is for any human being, from whatever section
of this country they may come, to speak of a bill of rights in connection with any
legislation whatsoever, and exclude from that bill of rights any mention of civil rights.
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Unquestionably the statute will, however, afford protection against
discriminatory treatment for those who are already members, en-
forceable by an action in the federal district courts.60
Section 101(a)(2)>7 safeguards the rights of members to meet
and assemble, express views and arguments, including their views
on candidates and union business at meetings. Section 101(a)(3)68
establishes the requirement of a majority vote by secret ballot at a
meeting held upon due notice, or in a referendum by secret ballot be-
fore a union can increase local union dues and initiation fees or levy
assessments. For international unions, the requirement is either a
majority vote of delegates at a regular convention, or at a special
convention held on at least thirty days written notice; or by a ma-
jority vote of all members voting in a secret ballot referendum; or,
where authorized by the union constitution, by action of the executive
board of the union, in which case it can be effective only until the
union's next regular convention.
The provisions which permit unions to place restrictions upon
the guaranteed rights contained in sections 101(a)(1) and (2)9 by
"reasonable rules" in the union constitution, will of course focus great
attention upon the restrictions of member rights and privileges con-
tained in union constitutions. Since it appears that only the restrictions
contained in union constitutions and bylaws can act as a limitation
upon the statutory rights, it will become increasingly necessary for
unions to codify in their constitutions the restrictions they seek to
impose upon members, and where such constitutional restrictions al-
ready exist, there will unquestionably be careful scrutiny and elimina-
tion of provisions which are manifestly unreasonable. As to just what
is "reasonable," we may anticipate that there will before long develop
a considerable body of case law."° In this connection, it is clear that
the safeguards against union disciplinary action contained in section
101(a) (5) ,'71 which require service of specified written charges, a
To do that is nothing but outright hypocrisy and deception of the lowest type.... ." The
Powell amendment was defeated by a vote of 215 to 160 in the House. Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 520 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 402(o)
(Supp. 1, 1959).
66 73 Stat. 522, 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a) (1) and (2), 412 (Supp. I, 1959).
67 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2) (Supp. I, 1959).
68 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (Supp. I, 1959).
69 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a) (1) and (2) (Supp. I, 1959).
70 It has been suggested that existing state law will have continuing vitality in
this area because of the limited federal experience in internal union disputes and because
of the overlapping jurisdiction created under the Landrum-Griffin Act. Summers, "The
Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact," 70 Yale LJ. 175, 176-77
(1960).
71 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (5) (Supp. I, 1959).
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reasonable period for the accused to prepare his defense, and a full
and fair hearing, give further importance to unions' constitutional
language. It seems unlikely that a court will sustain disciplinary action
against a member unless his conduct is in violation of requirements
which are reasonable and which are actually contained or may be
reasonably inferred from language in the written constitution of a
union, and that conduct which is not expressly prohibited by the con-
stitution will not be permitted to sustain disciplinary action.71 Since
under section 101(b),7 any provisions of union constitutions are de-
clared void if inconsistent with section 101, there will be some in-
teresting problems in drafting and interpreting disciplinary provisions
for union constitutions. Section 101 (a) (4)74 protects the rights of
members to institute proceedings in courts of law or before adminis-
trative agencies without interference by their unions, subject to the
requirement presumably if contained in the union constitution that
internal union remedies be first exhausted. 75 A member may not be
required to exhaust internal procedures that extend beyond four
months before filing such suit or proceedings." The right of members
to appear as witnesses in legislative, judicial or administrative pro-
ceedings, or to petition legislatures or to communicate with legislators
is protected.7 7 The same section forbids direct or indirect encourage-
ment or financing by employers of such activity. It will be interesting
to observe whether this latter restriction will have any effect on
pressures exerted upon various legislative bodies wherein employer
groups have solicited and encouraged employee participation, as in
mass letter writing or telegraphing campaigns.
The rights contained in section 101 are enforceable in the federal
district courts by appropriate remedy including injunctions. 8 In ad-
72 See discussion in Hickey, "The Bill of Rights of Union Members," 48 Geo L.J.
226, 250-56 (1959).
73 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(b) (Supp. I, 1959).
74 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4) (Supp. I, 1959).
75 An interesting theory is advanced in Powell, "The Bill of Rights-Its Impact
Upon Employers," 49 Geo. L.J. 270 (1959), regarding this provision. Referring to the
well-established rule in the courts that the grievance-arbitration machinery is an em-
ployee's exclusive avenue of relief for violations of labor agreements (absent unfair
dealing by the bargaining agent) Powell suggests that § 101(a)(4) may change the
rule. Since a union is forbidden by the statute to restrict a member's right to sue, it
may not lawfully enter into a collective bargaining agreement with an employer which
would have the same effect. It is doubtful whether the courts will adopt this ingenious
theory, since it would seem contrary to the congressional intent not to interfere with
collective bargaining rights of unions in the new act.
76 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4) (Supp. I, 1959).
77 Ibid.
78 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (Supp. I, 1959).
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dition, existing state, federal and administrative remedies, and remedies
under any union constitution, are expressly preserved by section 103." °
Section 104 is the one section which confers a right upon persons be-
cause of their employee status rather than to union members as such.
This is the right to receive or inspect collective bargaining agreements.
Unlike the other rights under title I, this right is enforceable only by
the Secretary of Labor by suit in the federal courts, under section 210
of the act. 80
Violations of title I of the act are expressly exempted from the
Secretary of Labor's exceedingly broad investigatory powers con-
ferred by section 601 of the act.8 However, since section 60982 pro-
hibits unions and their officers and representatives from disciplining
members for exercising any right under the act, and since the coverage
of section 601 includes matters arising under section 609, it would
seem that the Secretary in actuality would have full investigatory
power over most violations of the Bill of Rights if there is disciplinary
action against a member. Section 61011 of the act makes it a crime to
use or threaten the use of force or violence or to coerce or interfere
with a member's utilization of rights under any provision of the act.
ELECTION RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
The regulation of union elections under Landrum-Griffin is so
scattered throughout the statute as almost to warrant a recodification.
(a) Title I, sections 101 (a) (1) and (2)84 guarantees members the
right to nominate candidates, to vote, and to express their opinions of
candidates. These rights are enforceable under section 10285 by civil
suit in the federal court, and against violence and threats by criihinal
prosecution under section 610.86
(b) Title III, 7 dealing generally with the regulation of trustee-
ships, forbids the counting of the votes from a union under trustee-
ship, unless its delegates are elected by secret ballot in an election in
which all good standing members of the union under trusteeship were
eligible to participate. Wilful violations of this provision are made a
79 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 413 (Supp. I, 1959).
80 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 414 (Supp. I, 1959); 73 Stat. 529 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § 440 (Supp. I, 1959).
81 73 Stat. 539 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. I, 1959).
82 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 529 (Supp. I, 1959).
83 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 530 (Supp. I. 1959).
84 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a) and (b) (Supp. I, 1959).
85 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (Supp. I, 1959).
86 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 530 (Supp. I, 1959).
87 73 Stat. 530-32 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-66 (Supp. I, 1959).
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crime under section 303(b) .8 The criminal sanctions of section 610
would also be applicable here. 9
(c) Title IV90 is entirely devoted to the regulation of union elec-
tions. It makes mandatory the holding of elections at least every five
years for international officers, every four years for officers of inter-
mediate bodies, and every three years for local officers. International
officers must be elected either by secret ballot among the members in
good standing, or in convention by delegates elected by secret ballot.
Similar provisions apply to elections of officers in intermediate bodies.
Local officers must be elected by secret ballot among the members in
good standing.9 1 In any election of union officers, a candidate has the
right to have his literature distributed by the union to the members
at his expense, by mail or otherwise, and the union is required to
refrain from discrimination among the candidates in making available
lists of the members and in the distribution of literature. The two
foregoing rights are enforceable in the federal courts.92 Where there
is a union security contract in effect, any candidate has the right to
inspect a membership list within thirty days before the election, and he
is entitled to an observer at the polls and counting of ballots.93 This
title establishes safeguards for adequate notice of secret ballot elec-
tions, and to protect against disfranchisement of members because of
delay in the receipt of checked-off dues.94 Unions are prohibited from
using union funds in any election, and employers are forbidden to
contribute funds to promote a union candidate.9" Union constitutional
provisions regarding election procedures, so far as they are not incon-
sistent with the act, are given the force of law and must be followed in
elections under title IV.9
6
A member who is aggrieved by a violation of title IV, including
the valid election provisions of his union constitution, is required first
to exhaust his remedies under the union constitution. If within three
months after initiating his grievance with the union he has still not
obtained a final decision, he may then within one month file a com-
plaint with the Secretary of Labor.97 Within sixty days thereafter,
if he finds probable cause to believe there is a violation, the Secretary
88 73 Stat. 531 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 463(b) (Supp. I, 1959).
89 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 530 (Supp. I, 1959).
90 73 Stat. 532-34 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83 (Supp. I, 1959).
91 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481 (Supp. I, 1959).
92 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (Supp. I, 1959).
93 Ibid.
94 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (Supp. I, 1959).
95 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(g) (Supp. I, 1959).
96 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 481(e), (f), 482(a), (c) (Supp. I, 1959).
97 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (Supp. I, 1959).
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may file suit against the labor organization in the federal district
court." Pending the decision of the court, the election is presumed
valid and the elected officers may continue to function.99 The court
may direct an election, if one has not been held within the period re-
quired by section 401, or direct a new election if there have been
violations of section 401 that may have affected the outcome of the
election. The court is empowered to order an election under the Secre-
tary's supervision.100 While the court's orders are appealable, an
order directing an election may not be stayed pending an appeal.'"
Where union constitutions fail to provide an adequate procedure to
remove an officer for misconduct, the Secretary may, after an adminis-
trative hearing held in accordance with the Administrative Procedure
Act, direct an election by secret ballot among the members to remove
such officer. 0 2 The Secretary is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations to determine the adequacy of union removal procedures
applicable to officers guilty of misconduct. 0 3
In ,any investigation of violations of title IV, the Secretary is
empowered to make use of investigatory powers provided in section
601,104 which are probably as broad as any that exist under the law
today.
(d) Title V makes it a crime for any person, who has been con-
victed or served part of a prison term for specified crimes, or who has
been a member of the Communist Party within the preceding five
years, to serve as a union officer.'0 5 It appears that under the language
of section 504 (a) it is also a criminal violation for any labor organiza-
tion or officer knowingly to permit any person to hold a union office
if such person is disqualified under the foregoing provision. 06
Members who complain of breaches of their rights under the
election provisions of the law remain free before the election to use
any existing state court remedies,'07 but the procedures under the act
are made exclusive after the election has been conducted. 08
98 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (Supp. I, 1959).
O9 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (Supp. I, 1959).
100 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (Supp. I, 1959).
101 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(d) (Supp. I, 1959).
102 73 Stat. 533 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(h) (Supp. I, 1959).
103 73 Stat. 533 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(i) (Supp. I, 1959).
104 73 Stat. 539 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. I, 1959).
105 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. I, 1959).
106 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (Supp. I, 1959).
107 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 483 (Supp. I, 1959). See also discussion of some
problems of jurisdictional confusion, in Daniels, "Union Elections and The Landrum-
Griffin Act," Thirteenth Annual Conference on Labor 317, 328-31 (1960), which also
discusses the few court decisions since passage of the act.
10S 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 483 (Supp. I, 1959).
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UNION FINANCES AND RIGHTS OF MEMBERS
Several separate titles of the Landrum-Griffin Act'0 9 include pro-
visions which bear upon the handling of union finances. Section 101
(a) (3) of title 1110 substantially restricts the power of unions to in-
crease dues and to levy assessments. In title II, section 201(b)"'
imposes the obligation upon unions to file annually detailed financial
reports, and the same title requires the union to make the same finan-
cial data available to the members. The right of members to examine
union books "for just cause" is enforceable by suit in either the
federal district courts or in state courts, with provision for an allow-
ance of reasonable attorney fees in such suit." 2 Reports are also re-
quired from union officers or employees if they, their spouses or
minor children hold an interest in the union, receive income or mone-
tary benefit from the union or engage in certain specified conflict-of-
interest transactions." 3 Generally speaking, these transactions may be
either (1) with an employer whose employees the union represents or
seeks to represent; (2) with any business which deals with such an
employer; (3) with any business which buys from, or sells or leases
to the union, or (4) with labor relations consultants of an employer." 4
Where no such transactions have occurred, a negative report is not
required." 5 Reports filed under this title are public,"' and the Secre-
tary of Labor may publish any reports or data so filed,117 or make
them available for examination,1 8 or furnish copies at cost to any
persons except that copies may be furnished upon request and without
cost to the governor of any state."0 Unions and individuals filing re-
ports are required to preserve for five years the documents upon which
the reports are based.2 Under this title, heavy criminal penalties may
be imposed for wilful violation, including false reporting or withholding
of required information, or the making of false entries or concealment
or destruction of records which are required to be kept. 2 ' The Secre-
-09 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. I, 1959).
110 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (3) (Supp. I, 1959).
"ll 73 Stat. 524 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 431(b) (Supp. I, 1959).
112 73 Stat. 524 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 431(c) (Stupp. I, 1959).
113 73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 432(a)(1-5) (Supp. I, 1959).
114 73 Stat. 526 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 432(a) (6) (Supp. I, 1959).
115 73 Stat. 526 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 432(c) (Supp. I, 1959).
116 73 Stat. 528 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 435(a) (Supp. I, 1959).
117 Ibid.
118 73 Stat. 528 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 435(b) (Supp. I, 1959).
119 73 Stat. 528 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 435(c) (Supp. I, 1959).
120 73 Stat. 529 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 436 (Supp. I, 1959).
121 73 Stat. 529 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 439 (Supp. I, 1959).
[Vol. 2 2
MEMBERS' CONTROL
tary of Labor is also empowered to bring a civil action in the federal
courts for relief, including injunctions, against violations or threatened
violations of this title.1
22
Title 111123 of the act regulates the financial dealings of unions
under trusteeship. The financial reports required under title II, in-
cluding those for the organization as well as for officers and employees
are required of the trustees as well.' 24 Criminal penalties for violation
of these reporting provisions are provided,'125 and authority is granted
to the Secretary of Labor to proceed civilly in the federal courts for
relief against violations, actual or threatened. 126 Labor organizations
are expressly authorized to impose trusteeships upon subordinate
bodies in accordance with their constitutions for the purpose of cor-
recting corruption or financial malpractice,'27 but when a trusteeship
is imposed, the parent organization is forbidden to take anything more
from the local than the normal per capita tax and assessments. 2 s The
parent organization is authorized, however, to distribute the assets of
the organization under trusteeship in accordance with the union con-
stitution in the event of a bona fide dissolution of the subordinate
body. 29 Violation of these provisions is separately punishable as a
crime. 30 This title authorizes suits by either the subordinate union,
or by any member, or by the Secretary of Labor in the federal district
courts1 3 1 for relief, including injunction against trusteeship improperly
imposed or operated. All other existing remedies at law or in equity
are expressly preserved.'32 Members or subordinate labor organiza-
tions are given the option of filing a written complaint with the Secre-
tary in such cases, and in the event he finds probable cause to believe
there is a violation and files suit under section 304(a), he is required
to withhold the identity of the complainant, 13  and the jurisdiction of
the district court over the trusteeship becomes exclusive and its final
judgment is res judicata. 1 34
122 73 Stat. 530 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 440 (Supp. I, 1959).
123 73 Stat. 530-32 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-66 (Supp. I, 1959).
124 73 Stat. 530 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 461(a) and (b) (Supp. I, 1959).
125 73 Stat. 530 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 461(b), (c), (d) and (e) (Supp. I, 1959).
120 73 Stat. 530 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 461(b) (Supp. I, 1959); 73 Stat. 530 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 440 (Supp. I, 1959).
127 73 Stat. 531 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 462 (Supp. I, 1959).
123 73 Stat. 531 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 463(a) (Supp. I, 1959).
129 Ibid.
130 73 Stat. 531 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 463(b) (Supp. I, 1959).
131 73 Stat. 531 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 464(a) (Supp. I, 1959).
132 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 466 (Supp. I, 1959).
133 73 Stat. 531 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 464(a) (Supp. I, 1959).
134 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 466 (Supp. I, 1959).
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Title IV' 35 of the act, which regulates union elections, also con-
tains important limitations upon the use of union funds. The use of
funds of the union received from dues, assessments or similar levy to
promote a candidate for union office is prohibited.'36 Where a distribu-
tion of literature of any union candidate is made by the union, it
seems clear that the union is obligated to require the candidate to
reimburse the union for the reasonable expense of such distribution,
and that it is required to treat all candidates equally with regard to
the expense of such distribution. 13 7 In the event of a violation of the
foregoing, the broad power of the Secretary of Labor to investigate
is included under sections 601(a) and (b) of the act. 3 ' Where a
violation of these provisions also violates the union constitution, mem-
bers may continue to enforce the constitutional provisions by any
existing remedies.'39 It is likely that a use of union funds to support
a candidate for union office would be held to violate the provisions of
title V14° and the remedies therein contained would be available.
Title V'41 is the major section of the new act for the regulation
of financial affairs of labor organizations. Declaring that union officials
occupy "positions of trust" in relation to the union and the members,
the act imposes upon them the duty to manage, invest and expend
union funds and property in accordance with the constitution of the
union and resolutions of its governing body, and to do the same solely
for the benefit of the union and the members. Union officers are for-
bidden to deal adversely with the union or on behalf of any adverse
party. They are forbidden to hold or acquire a conflicting interest, and
they are required to account to the union for any profit received out
of any transaction with the union conducted by them or under their
direction.142 Officers may not be exempted from liability for breach
of these fiduciary duties by any exculpatory provision of the union
constitution or by an exculpatory resolution of the governing body of
the union. 43
Where a violation of fiduciary duty is alleged and the union or
its officers fail to sue for appropriate relief, after being requested to
do so by any member, such member is authorized by the act to in-
stitute an action for the benefit of the union in the federal courts or in
135 73 Stat. 532-34 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481-83 (Supp. I, 1959).
136 73 Stat. 533 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(g) (Supp. I, 1959).
137 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 481(c) and (g) (Supp. I, 1959).
138 Ibid.
139 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 483 (Supp. I, 1959).
140 73 Stat. 535 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 501 (Supp. I, 1959).
141 Ibid.




a state court, to recover damages, or for an accounting or other relief.
Prior to the filing of such action, leave of the court must be obtained
upon verified application, which may be made ex parte. In such action,
if successful, the court may allow out of the recovery, attorney fees
and necessary expenses.144
Union officers, employees, trustees, and employees of trusts (in
which unions have an interest), who handle funds or property of the
trust, are required to be bonded by a corporate surety who is au-
thorized by the Secretary of the Treasury as an acceptable surety on
federal bonds, and the bond may not be placed through any agent,
broker or surety company in which any union or union representative
has an interest.145 No union officer or employee may borrow a total
of more than $2000 from a union. 146 No union or employer may pay
directly or indirectly the fine of any officer or employee convicted of
any wilful violation of the act.14 7 Heavy criminal penalties are imposed
for embezzlement, theft or wilful conversion of union funds or prop-
erty by a union officer or employee, 48 for violation of the bonding
requirement, 49 for making a loan in a prohibited amount 50 or for pay-
ment by a union or employer of a fine levied against an officer or
employee for violation of the act.' 5'
Title V152 also amends section 302 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act by prohibiting employers, employer associations, or
consultants from making gifts or loans to unions or union officers who
represent or seek to represent their employees; and unions and their
officers are forbidden to accept such gifts or loans.5 3 The prohibition
extends to gifts or loans to employees or employee committees, where
it is intended to cause the employees or committees to influence other
employees in the exercise of their rights to join unions or bargain col-
lectively; the prohibition further applies to gifts or loans to unions or
union officials intended to influence their actions as employee repre-
sentatives. 4 Unions and their officers and employees are forbidden to
require a fee for unloading trucks, other than compensation for em-
ployees who perform the work. 5
144 73 Stat. 535 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (Supp. I, 1959).
145 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 502(a) (Supp. I, 1959).
146 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 503(a) (Supp. I, 1959).
147 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 503(b) (Supp. I, 1959).
148 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (Supp. I, 1959).
149 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 502(b) (Supp. I, 1959).
150 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 503(c) (Supp. I, 1959).
151 Ibid.
152 73 Stat. 537 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (Supp. I, 1959).
153 Ibid.
154 73 Stat. 537 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 186(a) and (b) (1) (Supp. I, 1959).
155 73 Stat. 538 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 186(b) (2) (Supp. I, 1959).
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Finally, title VI prohibits picketing of any employer for personal
profit or enrichment, and imposes a heavy penalty for violation.5 6
CONCLUSION
The new act has substantially done away with most of the im-
pediments, both substantive and procedural, that formerly hampered
suits involving union assets. 57 The inclination of the courts to apply
to unions the law of fraternal associations, the reluctance of the courts
to intervene in internal union affairs, the problems inherent in class
suits, and problems of jurisdiction-these among others' are for
the most part overcome by the comprehensive, if scattered, regula-
tion of union finances and elections in the Landrum-Griffin Act. There
is no doubt that the new act has created strong legal weapons
for individual members and for minority factions in unions. For
the most part, existing remedies in the state courts are preserved, but
the ready access to the federal courts provided under the act without
reference to diversity or jurisdictional amount, and the broad powers
given to the courts under the act for the fashioning of remedies, sug-
gest that litigation will naturally tend to gravitate toward the federal
courts.' - 9 Provision for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation will
of course encourage the filing of lawsuits, as will the protection against
disciplinary action by the union contained in section 609. It is doubt-
ful whether suits under section 501 (b) of the new act will be signifi-
cantly delayed or discouraged by the requirement that the union must
first be given an opportunity to file suit, or by the requirement that
leave of court be first obtained. Since the application for leave may
be made ex parte, it can be assumed that leave will be granted auto-
matically in any case where the proposed complaint and supporting
affidavits make out a prima facie case.
It seems safe to predict that in spite of the clear reservations of
state jurisdiction contained in the new law, the practical effect of this
statute will inevitably be to shift from state to federal courts the
forum for most future litigation involving members' control over
officers, elections, and finances.
156 73 Stat. 539 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 522 (Supp. I, 1959).
157 See Dugan, "Fiduciary Obligations Under The New Act," 48 Geo. L.J. 277,
278-83, 301-03 (1959).
158 See Summers, "The Impact of Landrum-Griffin in State Courts," Thirteenth
Annual Conference on Labor, 333, 337-56 (1960).
159 Where the state courts are used, they will probably tend to adopt standards
conforming to those established in Landrum-Griffin. Id. at 351-60 (1960). See also,
Wollett, "Fiduciary Problems Under Landrum-Griffin," id. at 267, 287-90.
